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Many books and articles on the nature of truth have appeared over the last six or seven 
years, and one might contend that because of this the market for any new texts would 
have reached a saturation point. Yet, there appears to be no end in sight motivating further 
discussion of theories of truth. Whether defending traditional correspondence (Vision 
2009), mediated correspondence (Horgan and Potrč 2009), alethic pluralism (Lynch 2009; 
Wright and Pedersen 2014), an axiomatic theory of truth (Halbach 2014), a primitive 
theory of truth (Asay 2013), a variant on relativism about truth (MacFarlane 2011; 
Richard 2004) or providing a general survey of the philosophic terrain (Glanzberg 
forthcoming; Wrenn 2014), proponents of a variety of theories of truth have continued to 
improve upon well-established views. 
Among the contributions are further elaborations of the group’s eldest member: the 
correspondence theory of truth. Dating back at least to the time of Aristotle (if not 
before), the correspondence theory has enjoyed not only what seems to be a long history 
but a deep following motivating some philosophers to believe that the correspondence 
theory is the view that any person naturally may find most appealing (cf. Horwich 
1998a). In Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth, Joshua Rasmussen (2014) has 
penned a novel contribution to the discussion. Rasmussen’s book is chock full of 
arguments, is highly informative, is clearly written, and is an important resource for both 
the novice and expert, alike. 
The traditional correspondence theory of truth has it that there is a relationship of 
correspondence between a truth-bearer, such as a posit, sentence, proposition, or assertion 
and its truth-maker, the facts or state-of-aﬀairs that make the truth-bearer true. A general 
or sweeping conceptual definition of the correspondence theory is: a claim is true if and 
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only if it agrees with the way the world is. For example, the proposition that ‘the cat is on 
the mat’ is true if and only if there is a cat and there is a mat where the cat bears the 
factual relation of ‘on’ to the mat. Of course, traditional correspondence theories run into 
significant diﬃculties because, for example, they cannot explain how a proposition says 
anything about some non-existent thing. Whereas ‘the cat is on the mat’ is about a cat 
and its relationship with a mat, ‘the unicorn has one horn’ fails to refer to anything and 
cannot be about a non-existent unicorn or its non-existent single horn. There cannot be a 
correspondence relation without two relata, the truth-bearer and its truthmaker.  
Rasmussen skilfully argues for a correspondence conception of truth using a property-
arrangement theory of propositions that sets out to challenge and quash well-known 
criticisms of correspondence truth. For Rasmussen’s correspondence theory, a proposition, 
p, corresponds with an arrangement, A, if and only if (i) for each exemplifiable part of p, 
there is a part of A that exemplifies it, (ii) the proposition that A exists entails p, and (iii) 
every part of A is part of a composition that overlaps exactly those things that exemplify 
part of p (Rasmussen 2014, §5.4). One might wonder how on this view propositions are 
about entities or abstracta. According to Rasmussen, a proposition is about a thing or 
entity if and only if that proposition contains a property necessarily unique to the entity, 
and this ‘aboutness’ relation applies not only to entities of sense experience but abstracta, 
too. A proposition is true when and only when it is about a unique arrangement of 
properties. 
Rasmussen’s theory yields at least four desirable consequences (cf. §5.6). First, since a 
proposition corresponds with an arrangement of properties and its constituent parts, it can 
be true or false when it is intuitively about an empirical matter of fact, a fiction, or 
abstracta. Second, his view circumvents the problem of matching a world with a linguistic 
element by analysing the correspondence relation using an arrangement of properties 
which people intuitively understand. Third, while correspondence theories have had a 
diﬃcult time explaining how a true proposition has to do with existing things, 
Rasmussen’s modifications allow propositions to reflect a relationship with the 
arrangement of properties rather than existent or non-existent things. Finally, it appears 
that Rasmussen’s modified correspondence theory can explain the equivalence schema 
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deflationists about truth adopt because the conditions of correspondence in the property-
arrangement theory satisfy the semantic demands of deflationism. A theory of truth that 
depends upon the special notion of arrangements, as Rasmussen’s view does, avoids the 
trickiest problems that confront correspondence theories. 
There are relatively few problems with the technical details of Rasmussen’s modified 
correspondence theory. In fact, so far as I can tell, no part of the syntactical or logical 
apparatus in Rasmussen’s arrangement of properties view deserves to be challenged; rather, 
what one might question is whether Rasmussen’s theory is representative of a 
correspondence theory at all. When I mentioned Horwich earlier, I did so deliberately 
because he is a someone who goes out of the way to show how his minimalist view 
accommodates what he calls the ‘correspondence intuition’. According to the minimalist 
view, the equivalence schema: ⟨p⟩ is true if and only if p is conceptually, explanatorily, 
logically, and epistemologically fundamental, such that all of its instances are wholly 
underived and the overall use of the predicate ‘… is true’ is best explained by the 
equivalence schema. Horwich accommodates the so-called ‘correspondence intuition’ by 
elaborating a deflationary account of reference (Horwich 1995, 1998b; cf. Leeds 1978). If 
Horwich’s minimalism is able to capture the ‘correspondence intuition’ and there is reason 
to believe that the fundamentality of minimalism also captures Rasmussen’s property-
arrangement view, then the distinction between minimalism and correspondence theories 
seems to evaporate. After all, one of the benefits of Rasmussen’s view is that it can explain 
the equivalence schema of deflationary accounts of truth. Perhaps it can do so because the 
theory just is a deflationary account. Generally, then, perhaps Rasmussen should defend his 
view against the idea that it just collapses into a deflationary account.  
Second, maybe what Rasmussen has oﬀered us is an alternative correspondence 
account aligned with the indirect or mediated correspondence theory (Barnard and 
Horgan 2013; Horgan 2011; Horgan and Barnard 2006; Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2006, 
2009). While the primary aim of the indirect or mediated correspondence view is to argue 
that truth just is semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards, 
Rasmussen’s correspondence theory revitalises our understanding of propositions and facts 
as arrangements of things or properties, respectively. If arrangements of things or 
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properties are just a matter of appreciating the background context, then there seems little 
distinction between the two views. When we contrast Horgan and colleague’s notion of 
indirect correspondence with Rasmussen, we find that the only way in which we might 
distinguish the two has to do with the ontological commitment involved in defending 
their respective theories. On one hand, Horgan and colleagues tend to lead toward an 
austere realism, one inhabited by a single extant object known as the ‘blobject’. 
Rasmussen, on the other hand, has relatively little to say about ontological commitment. 
Given his focus on facts, propositions, and properties, Rasmussen avoids talk of an austere 
or robust realism. But that avoidance should hardly justify us in thinking that there are 
relatively few overlaps between mediated correspondence and Rasmussen’s view. 
Despite these two minor quibbles, Rasmussen deftly anticipates a number of potential 
criticisms his exemplification view of correspondence might face. His articulation of 
responses to the problem of funny facts, including the issue of negative existentials, the 
slingshot argument and the liar paradox circulate around how the arrangement of 
properties or the arrangement of facts disables these objections to correspondence theories 
of truth. Rasmussen’s book is a pleasure to read and anyone interested in coming to 
understand the state of the debate over the correspondence theory of truth should take the 
time to digest Rasmussen’s fine addition to the truth literature. 
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